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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 20060711-CA

MARIA JOYCE JACOBS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1992), and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures 26(2)(a), whereby a
defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital
felony.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

I.

The plain and specific language of UCA Section 76-8-305 requires a detention

under the condition of arrest or arrest to be lawful or authorized by law and within
constitutional boundaries. When an officer effects an arrest for an alleged offense

1

committed outside of his presence, the Court evaluates the legality of the arrest
objectively, See State v. Ayala, 762 R2d 1107, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), State v.
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 (Utah App.), and in evaluating the reasonableness of the seizure
the Court affords little discretion to the district court because there must be statewide
standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials, State v. Hechtle, 89
P.3d 185 (Utah App. 2004).

II.

The State must prove the elements of the crime charged in the information, and the

instructions to the jury must contain the material constituents of the elements needed to
find necessary for conviction, based on the relevant legal criteria provided by the trial
judge. The Court reviews the trial courts instructions to the jury for correctness, affording
no deference, See Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). The complete
absence of an element instruction of a crime charged is an error the Court reviews to
avoid manifest injustice, See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures 19(c) and State v. Jones,
823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and constitutional provision are
contained in the text of this brief or in the Addendum:
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Utah Code Ann. Section 76-8-305

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-21-3

Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-6

Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-15

Utah Code Ann. Section 76-9-701(1)

Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-2

Utah Constitution Article I Section 14
United States Constitution Amendment IV
United States Constitution Amendment XIIII

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The state charged the appellant with public intoxication, criminal mischief,
disturbance of the peace, and interference with the arresting officer.

Due to

impecuniosity the appellant was assigned a Public Defender. At the time of pretrial the
appellant had been transferred between five public defenders. On March 14, 2006 the
charges were tried in a jury trial and the appellant was found not guilty of all charges
with the exception of interference in the detention or arrest.
FACTS
This case arises out of the detention and arrest of the appellant based on the
allegations of her next door neighbor that the appellant was disturbing the peace and was
damaging her property. The district court entered no findings of facts.

3

BACKROUND
The following general facts were established at trial: The appellant had been
renting a duplex apartment that included a carport space and had been planning on
moving sometime in the future.

Her next door neighbor made plans to move in to

appellant's larger unit, and prematurely purchased some furniture which the appellant
agreed to let her neighbor store temporarily in back of her carport until she could make
other arrangements. Instead, and without authority, her neighbor subsequently abrogated
the appellant's entire carport space in the appellant's absence. The night of her arrest the
appellant returned late to her residence to discover her carport barricaded with her patio
furniture and stacked full of the complainants property, a note on her door from her
neighbor that her "stuff had to come in to the appellants unit, and her dog, a small
beagle, missing from her premises. After a lengthy search of the area the appellant could
hear her dog whimpering from under the objects haphazardly stacked up under her
carport space.
When she called her small dog repeatedly, her dog did not come out. She therefore
started removing the barricade and pushing some of the objects aside. As she did, two of
her plastic patio chairs tumbled over and her neighbor came outside and threatened the
appellant that she was calling the cops to have her arrested. The appellant summoned the
landlord living nearby, for assistance, and then entered her car to move her car behind her
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carport for light. The appellant admitted at trial that due to the rain and cold she had
interrupted her search for her dog and had consumed a cup of hot tea with a modest
amount of alcohol to help her warm up.

RELEVANT FACTS TO THE CHARGE OF INTERFERANCE

The facts relevant to a determination whether the appellant violated Section 76-8-305 in
interfering in a lawful detention or arrest are basically undisputed. Deputy Barnes of the
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department responded to a call to dispatch from appellants
neighbor, hereinafter referred to as the complainant, that the appellant was intoxicated,
and throwing her brand new furniture she had stored under the appellants carport space
around the yard (testimony of Deputy Barnes, page 2 lines 24-25, page 3 line 1, page 11
line 25, page 12 lines 1-12). Deputy Barnes arrived in her marked patrol car and in
uniform (page 2 lines 19-23) and observed the appellant enter her car in back of the
property.

She observed the complainant by her front door calling out to stop the

appellant as she was drunk and attempting to leave (page 3 lines 24-25). Deputy Barnes
had not observed the appellant commit any offense (page 20 lines 13-15) or throw any
furniture (page 19 lines 6-8). She immediately approached the appellant in her car and
without asking any questions ordered her to exit the vehicle (page 12 lines 20-25, page 13
lines 1-10).
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The appellant testified at trial that she did not hear the officers' order as she was paying
attention to the complainant near her door jumping about and yelling that she had
permission. She was also distraught over her dog. The appellant rolled down the window
of her car and seeing the officer by her door explained to her that she was trying to
recover her dog from the objects stacked under her carport stall and intended to move her
car over and behind that part of the carport for light (page 6 lines 8-17, page 13 lines 1121). According to Deputy Barnes "she wasn't sure how it [the appellants explanation]
had anything to do with what was going on" (page 13 lines 11-21), so she again ordered
the appellant to exit the car, opened the door to the appellants car and smelled the odor of
alcohol, and extricated the appellant from her car, placed her on the ground and in
handcuffs. Because the appellant, prone on the ground, struggled having her hands
removed from under her body, Deputy Crawford assisted Deputy Barnes in turning the
appellant over and position her hands up behind her back to put her in to handcuffs and
place the appellant in to custody (page 6 lines 20-25, page 7 lines 3-4).

After placing the appellant on the ground and in custody Deputy Barnes then spoke to the
complainant by her door. She spoke only to the complainant and not to the landlord
standing nearby who had arrived after being summoned (page 7 lines 18-25, page 22 line
25) Deputy Barnes observed some chairs and a table turned on the side and was directed
by the complainant to the opposite side of the complainants vehicle parked under the
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carport, were she alleged the appellant had damaged her automobile in throwing furniture
(page 25 lines 17-20). Deputy Barnes observed a broken antenna and a scratch on the
front fender of the complainant's vehicle (page 8 lines 9-12).

Deputy Barnes provides no specific facts as to the type of furniture she observed, the
location of the furniture, or whether the furniture appeared to be damaged. Deputy Barnes
instead asserts that she placed the appellant in to custody because "she was refusing to
cooperate with [her] request to exit the vehicle on her own power." (page 22 lines 14-17).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Deputy Barnes took the appellant into custody not because she was performing her
duty, but instead because she entirely neglected her duty to first investigate before taking
any action. Deputy Barnes proceeded on presumptions as opposed to reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. From the outset Deputy Barnes lacked specific facts and
proceeded only on the complainants allegations. She had not observed the appellant in
order to form a reasonable belief the appellant was impaired or impaired to a degree that
rendered her incapable to safely operate her car. In addition the appellant was in the back
parking area of a private property not open to the general public and not located near the
entry to the public street, and she resided on that property.
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Deputy Barnes had no statutory authority and probable cause to take the appellant into
custody. She disregarded very relevant facts forming the totality of the circumstances and
did not possess the basic imperatives of concrete facts the appellant either presented a
danger to herself or anyone on the property or that the appellant committed a public
offense. The requirement of probable cause is a prerequisite under the Fourth
Amendment and a constitutional right the appellant was entitled to rely upon.

Deputy Barnes acted outside the scope of her authority as provided under the laws of the
State of Utah and the appellant was convicted by means that offend the Due Process
Clause.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The instruction to the jury on the charge of interference with arresting officer
under Section 76-8-305 was tantamount to a directed guilty verdict and the
jury's verdict was not responsive to the issues joined in the information.

Utah Code Ann. Section 76-8-305 as enacted in 1953 originally made it an offense to
intentionally interfere with a person recognized to be a law enforcement official seeking
to effect an arrest or detention whether there was a legal basis for the arrest. In 1975 the
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Court in State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, invalidated the Statute on constitutional
grounds on the basis that the language of the Statute failed to inform an ordinary citizen
as to the conduct sought to be proscribed.

The Legislature in 1981 repealed and reenacted the statute to specify interference in a
"lawful arrest and detention by use of force or the use of any weapon". In 1990 the
Legislature amended the Statute and expanded the proscribed conduct to include lawful
orders. The Statute states:

76-8-305, Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any
act that would impede the arrest or detention.
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The State charged the appellant in the information with violating the Section in that "she
did have knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge
that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the defendant....,
and did interfere with said arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon".
Although the charge involved several questions of law, the trial judge provided the jury
with only a mere abstract of the Act as opposed to declaring the principles of relevant
laws applicable to the facts brought out in the evidence. Because the jury found the
appellant not guilty of the remaining charges joined in the information, it required the
jury then to consider whether the action of the arresting officer was lawful in its inception.
Instead the instructions to the jury eliminated entirely the material constituents of the
elements the jury needed to find necessary for conviction and egregiously broadened the
basis for conviction to include subsections (2) and (3). While the trial judge did not direct
a guilty verdict in form, the jury instructions had the functional equivalent of a directed
verdict.

Compounding the jury's misconception of the issues was the prosecution depicting the
case compatible to a domestic dispute generally well known among the population as a
violent and dangerous situation (transcript page 20 lines 8-10) and the officer's action as
basic and proper police conduct in retaining a person for investigative purposes. The law,
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While based on federal rules of criminal procedures, the Supreme Court in Bollenbach v.
United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946) ruled that the question is whether guilt has been
found by a jury according to the procedure and standards approved for criminal trials and
that the "[discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate conclusions from
the testimony depends on the discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the
required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria."

The Utah Legislature basically adopted the federal rules of criminal procedures and
pursuant to Utah law the trial judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the facts of the case, UCA Section 78-21-3. An information instruction is not a
substitute for an element instruction. The Jury must be instructed with respect to all
elements that it must find to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such
instruction is reversible error as a matter of law, State v. Jones, 823 P. 2d 1059 (Utah
1991), citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980).

The prosecutorial misconduct and the jury instructions were so fundamentally
unfair as to deny the appellant the constitutional right to due process and resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.
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a lawful detention or arrest; (B) the detention or arrest was lawful in that the officer acted
under the authority of state law or within the scope of her authority; and (C) the appellant
interfered in the detention or arrest by the use of force or the use of any weapon.
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A. The appellant did not have knowledge the officer was seeking to effect a
lawful detention or arrest

Whether a person has knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
knowledge that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention depends in
the first instance whether the officer is seeking to arrest "that person or another person."
Only as to the later can the term "by exercise of reasonable care" be applied. Whether a
person has knowledge a peace officer is seeking to arrest him or her depends on the
objective circumstances and not on the subjective view harbored by the officer, See
Berkemer v. Mc Cartv, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah
1991).
Utah law requires that the person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested
of his or her intention, cause, and authority to arrest him or her except when the person is
arrested during the commission of a crime or under exigent circumstances, UCA Section
77-7-6. The appellant was not detained in an isolated area or an area where she was
unknown and could have fled to avoid detention. Instead, the appellant was outside her
residence and immediately and voluntarily dispelled any question that she intended to
leave the property.
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entirely unaware of the complainants allegations she had breached the peace and
willfully damaged her property.
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B.

Appellants detention under the condition of arrest or arrest was not

authorized by State Law; the arresting officer acted outside the scope of her
authority and violated appellants constitutional protected rights under Article
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United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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statute was used advisedly,

\nhui Anderson LLP, v.

In Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) the Supreme Court held that
"cannons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the
meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one,
cardinal canon before all others." The Court emphasized "courts must presume that the
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then the first canon is also the last: judicial
inquiry is complete."

As of the reenactment of UCA Section 76-8-305, subsequent to the Bradshaw decision,
the conduct proscribed in the Statute is specific and in harmony with the Federal and
State Constitution.

According to the plain language of the Statute it is not a crime to reasonable and
non-violently resist ones unlawful detention or arrest.

Whether a detention or arrest is lawful depends first and foremost on whether the officer
is acting under authority of State Law. Pursuant to Utah law a peace officer may stop any
person in a public place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense, and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his action, UCA 77-7-15. The section
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From the inception Deputy Barnes relied entirely on the accusations of the complainant.
The allegations that the appellant unreasonable disturbed

?

damaged piopiMly Mini iillcmplnl In ("let; cntajulnl cnlnrly I'miu flic complainant and
Barnes never questioned the veracity of the complainant's allegations. When
asked whether she was under the impression the appellant was throwing the complainants
furniture, Deputy Barnes responded; "I wasn't under the impression, I was informed by

dispatch with the complainant on the line with dispatch saying she was throwing
furniture," (transcript page 12 lines 4-8). Deputy Barnes testimony shows she considered
the complainant's allegations facts before she even arrived on the scene.

An arrest is lawful if it is authorized by statute and supported by probable cause, State v.
Harman, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 (Utah 1995).

Deputy Barnes testified she placed the appellant into custody in order to investigate the
complaint and because the appellant did not exit her car on her own volition. Taking a
person in to custody is an arrest. Warrant-less arrests in Utah are authorized only in
limited circumstances and require probable cause, UCA Section 77-7-2. Probable cause
must be based on either the personal observations of the officer and while committed in
the presence of the officer or based on reasonable trustworthy information and articulable,
concrete, and objective facts as opposed to subjective presumptions.

In State v.White, 586 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) officers relied on information provided
by the defendant's former spouse. The Court implicitly held the officers had no
experience with the defendant's former spouse which would allow them to assume the
accuracy of the information supplied. The Court concluded that the actions of the officers
were based "upon unreliable and unverified allegations that were not substantiated by
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and prudent person . . . would not be justified in believing the suspect committed the
offense." The Court further emphasized, that
"absent a risk to public safet} ...v , . , . • : •

p
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"! information," id at 263.

independenl u»n ' p r u ^ v cfl

;\ .1 in ' unrein in mi ni ni ni essential part of police investigations. W "liilc Deputy Barnes
characterized her interference in the appellant's liberty as investigative detention, she
never posed a single question to the appellant even after she placed her in handcu. . .;;. I
she also did not question the lanuu..,; ... ;. po*.

**

,

while liK'onsisk nl dnnon.slnliw1 :: 11 * * siilvsnint'ntly m:v\v no reasonable inquiry of a truly
!?1

-tiu *

itnro md relied instead on superficial observations. In addition, the totality

of the circumstances did not bear the indicia of reliability of the allegations,
• The complainant was not verbally abusive, aggressive, or tumultuous in the
" officer's presence, and no other pei 51
i l l ' 11II11»111

i I III

("HVH V .

5
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i, i»1 n • ; i

i m 11•I „ i i »I" a
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' * * * :r ja of her front door but directed Deputy Barnes to

damages on her vehicle parked under the carport with the passenger side facing the
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appellants carport stall and accordingly on the side of the vehicle not in her field of
vision.
• Furniture having been thrown would cause indentations to the body of the vehicle
as opposed to a scratch.
The complainant in the instant case was not a third party impartial informant. Alleged
victims accusations alone can not form a basis for a warrant-less arrest. A federal case on
point is Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F. 3d 912 (9th Cir. 2001) where
it was proclaimed the alleged victim made a false criminal report to provide the means
whereby the police would take the plaintiff in the case in to custody. The Court held,
"In establishing probable cause officers may not solely rely on the claim of a
citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate
the basis of the witnesses knowledge or interview other witnesses," id at 925.

Deputy Barnes had understood the appellant was concerned about her dog and attempted
to retrieve her dog from under her carport, she testified, however, that she "wasn't sure
how it had anything to do with what was going on" (testimony page 13 line 19). When an
officer literally has no idea what is going on and whether a citizen has violated the law,
both the State and Federal Constitution commands that the officer either let the individual
be or conduct first a proper investigation. An officer may deprive a person of liberty
when, and only when, the officer has a viable claim that the individual has committed a
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crime. Deputy Barnes did not satisfy that fundamental u ^ ^
verified facts Depuly Bailies lac kal piohiihk1 ciiuse.
'Hi

i! hi 1 1 li

il iiiiivasonablr seizures is one of the most cherished rights

guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitution," Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.
3d 506, 511 (Utah 2005).
The Fourth Amendment and Article 1 Section 14 oi u.. , ... *' onstitution taken \niliufiin
from ti*.

<
- * .Jonstitu 111 • 11 | i \i > I

4 f

penplr

| > n 1111 .:i 11 11.111
i hv secure in theii pei son . . . against

unreasonable seizures shall not be violated . . . but upon probable cause"[.]
Probable cause applies whether the intrusion upon personal security are termed arrests or
investigatory detentions, Davis v. Missi i|i|ii, y)! 11 ">

L ...d , . (I'M)1'). I In inilial

interference mus: . . ,.

• ...

]

|Vi m

•

•

)

" ^>" • !*' "'• H'i^*. \. Texas. 443 U.S. 47 v1979),

'

and an investigative detention must be brief, unintrusive and can not approach the
condition of arrest, See Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).

!o (lit11 pnilviblr cms f requirement, the Court confined its exclusions to brief stops and the
frisk for weapons in situations in which the officer acted on his own observations of
suspicious conduct and oi

;

n.ible information that the suspect was armed and dangerous.

While officer safety was a concern in Terry, "the decision did not create a broad or
general officer safety exception to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment," State y.
Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah App. 2003). The Court in Brown supra emphasized
that 'absent a factual basis for detaining the person, the risk of arbitrary and abusive
police practices is to great," id at 51-52.

Deputy Barnes testimony reveals that while she did not communicate that fact, she
immediately decided to place the appellant in to custody based on the mere allegations of
the complainant and the reason to order the appellant immediately out of her car.
Pursuant to Utah Law and the rules promulgated by Utah Appellate Courts and the
United States Supreme Court, however, Deputy Barnes authority was limited to
conducting a brief inquiry in to suspicious circumstances and any further detention
required consent or probable cause.

Deputy Barnes lacked probable cause and lawful authority and the detention and
arrest of the appellant was unlawful.

In United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) it was at issue whether officers possessed
the required probable cause to arrest the defendant. The prosecutor on trial and on appeal
argued that the defendant's failure to protest the arrest could be used to create probable
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resisted his arrest.

grounds, it did reach the issue of

resisting arrest on dicta, stating "One has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest
and Courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases," id at 594.
Unquestionable, innocent people would generally react
not based

i",

irit-.nli IIUI

. ng.

n \ L-^ligtitl* Hi

C. The appellant did not interfere in the detention or arrest by use of force,
and the facts do not support the conclusion that she did.

'—- American HenuiKc uiciioiiary oi Hie hn^n^n i-cu.aia-e p f*N'i I1 ? ,

Q) defines

wci ui viuiuiic^. \ei^4ers Third New International
Dictionary p. 887 (1986) defines force as strength or energy of an exceptional degree and
also as to do violence. Blacks Law Dictionary p. 673 (8" ll ed 2004) defines force as
power, violence, or pressure directed against a pers< • • i L i t g , I liv 1 11
<
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generally understood as an aggressive act. A non-passive act is therefore only an act of
force if there is power or strength of an exceptional degree directed at a person.
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Although Deputy Barnes testified the appellant kicked, the problem with Deputy Barnes
testimony is that while her action did not comport to the circumstances, she articulates
the circumstances to comport to her actions. The appellant after having been thrown to
the ground in a prone position could not kick in the direction of the Deputies. Instead, the
appellant instinctively reacted to the unexplained, unexpected, and excessive force
employed by Deputy Barnes. A reasonable evaluation of Deputy Barnes testimony shows
instead that the appellant protested and struggled for balance due to her prone position
and struggled with having her arms painfully forced up behind her back.

There was no strength, power, or violence directed at the Deputies, there was no
force exerted by the appellant herself as force is defined.

CONCLUSION
Because Deputy Barnes acted outside the scope of her authority and because the
conviction was obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause, the conviction
of the appellant necessitates for the verdict to be overturned.
Wherefore the appellant respectfully request that this Honorable Court reverse the
judgment of the lower court for an entry of acquittal.

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
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This case presents important issues regarding the District Courts interpretation of UCA
Section 76-8-305 pertaining to interference with a peace officer, and jury instructions
having the effect of a directed guilty verdict.

Respectfully submitted this ^ 13 i^

_day of November 2006.

Maria Joyce Jacobs
Appellant pro se
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ADDENDUM

FILED DISTBIST COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 1 5 2606
SALT LAKE COUNTY
~~

JJ

Deputyuleri

In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
State of Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARIA JOYCE JACOBS,

Case No. 041907003

Defendant,

You are instructed that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, is charged by the
Information which has been duly filed with the commission of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF;
INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING AN ARREST; DISORDERLY
CONDUCT; and INTOXICATION. The Information alleges:
COUNT I
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about October 21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
106, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS,
a party to the offense, intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of Nancy Garner,
causing a pecuniary loss to Nancy Garner equal to or in excess of $300, but less than $1,000 in
value.
COUNT II
INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING AN ARREST, a Class B
Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October
21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 305, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, a party to the offense, did have
knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have had knowledge, that a peace officer
was seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of the defendant or another, and did interfere
with said arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon.

COUNT ra
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, a Class C Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about October 21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Section
102(l)(b)(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE
JACOBS, a party to the offense, intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly created a risk thereof, after a request by another to desist, engaged in fighting or in
violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior.
COUNT IV
INTOXICATION, a Class C Misdemeanor, at 1028 Riches Avenue, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about October 21, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Section 701(1),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MARIA JOYCE JACOBS, aparty
to the offense, was under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having
the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the defendant may have endangered herself
or another, in a public place or in a private place where the defendant unreasonably disturbed other
persons.

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041907003 MO

MARIA JOYCE JACOBS,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

STEPHEN L HENRIOD
June 26, 2 0 06

PRESENT
Clerk:
lynm
Prosecutor: BROWN, TIFFANY M
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SEAMAN, CHRISTINE M
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 14, 1946
Audio
Tape Number:
41
Tape Count: 1044
CHARGES
2. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/14/2006 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 170 day(s).
Attorney Fees
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION

Page 1

Case No: 041907003
Date:
Jun 26, 2 0 06

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s).
Probation is to be-supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service.
Defendant to serve 10 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
The defendant to enter into and complete the Cognitive
Restructuring classes approved by the Court or Probation Officer.
The defendant is to serve 10 days jail forthwith.
The defendant is to pay fine of $750 and recoupment of $500 at the
rate of $150 a month beginni.ng 30 days after release.
The defendant is not to drink or possess alcohol or be present when
alcohol is present or being consumed.
The defendant is to be evaluated and complete any alcohol abuse
treatment recommended.
Dated this

day of

, 20

.

STEPHEN L HENRIOD
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)

STATUTORY DEFINITION OF Interference with Arresting Officer
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 3 ?
A person commits Interference With Arresting Officer if she
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest

or

detention

of

that

person

and

interferes

with

the

arrest or detention by:
(1) the use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by
lawful
and

order:

(b)

made

(a) necessary
by

a

peace

to effect
officer

the arrest

involved

in

or
the

detention;
arrest

or

detention; or,
(3)the arrested person's refusal to refrain from performing
act that would impede the arrest or detention.

any

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page 8
ELEMENTS OF Interference with Arresting Officer
INSTRUCTION NO ^)~$? _
Before you can convict the defendant, Maria Joyce Jacobs,
of the crime of Interference With Arresting Officer, as charged
in count II of the Information, you must find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that
crime:
1.

That on or about the 21st day of October, 2004,

in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Maria
Joyce

Jacobs,

knowledge,
should

or

have

as
by

had

a

party

the

to

exercise

the
of

knowledge, that

offense,

had

reasonable

a peace

care

officer

is

seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of her;
and
2.

That Maria Joyce Jacobs did interfere with the arrest
or detention by use of force or any weapon;
or

3.

That Maria Joyce Jacobs did refuse to perform any act
required
arrest

by
or

lawful

order

detention

and

necessary
made

by

to
a

effect

peace

the

officer

involved in the arrest or detention;
or
4.

That

Maria

performing
detention.

Joyce
any

act

Jacobs

refused

that would

to

impede

refrain
her

from

arrest

or

INSTRUCTION NO. SJ
Page 9

(

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must

find the defendant

guilty of Interference With Arresting

Officer as charged in count II of the information.

If, on the

other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find
the defendant not guilty of count II.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page 15
DEFINITIONS
INSTRUCTION NO.

41

Annoyance is defined as a condition or situation that
interferes with the use or enjoyment of property.
Desist is defined as to stop or leave off.
A person engages in conduct Intentionally, or with intent
or willfully with respect to the nature of her conduct or to a
result of her conduct, when it is her conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person engages in conduct Knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his
conduct when she is aware of the nature of her conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.
A person engages in conduct Recklessly with respect to
circumstances surrounding her conduct or the result of her
conduct when she is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Tumultuous is defined as tumult, a violent agitation of
mind or feelings, a violent outburst.
Violent is defined as (1) strong physical force, or (2)
passionately threatening.

Note posted by Garner on my front door the night of
October 20,2004.

•fffifA-

Cash Count Franking D<
CMInital
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force, n. Power, violence, or pressure directed against
a person or thing.
actual force. Force consisting in a physical act, esp.
a violent act directed against a robbery victim. —
Also termed physical force. [Cases: Roobery <3=D6.
CJ.S. Robbery §§" 13-23.]
constructive force. Threats and intimidation to
gain control or prevent resistance; esp., threatening words or gestures directed against a robbery
victim. [Cases: Robbery <S=»6. CJ.S. Robbery
§§ 13-23.]
deadly force. Violent action known to create a
substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily
harm. • A person may use deadly force in selfdefense only if retaliating against another's deadly
force. — Also termed extreme force. Cf. nondeadly
force.
"Under the common law the use of deadly force is never
permitted for the sole purpose of stopping one fleeing from
arrest on a misdemeanor charge
" Rollin M. Perkins &
Ronald N, Boyce, Criminal Law 1098 (3d ed. 1982).

excessive force. Unreasonable or unnecessary force
under the circumstances.
extreme force. See deadly force.
independent force. Force not stimulated by a situation created by the actor's conduct.
intervening force. Force that actively produces
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or
omission has been committed.
irresistible force. Force that cannot be foreseen or
controlled, esp. that which prevents the performance of a contractual obligation; FORCE MAJEURE.

[Cases: Contracts
§§520-522,524.]

<S=*309(1).

CJ.S. Contracts

o
force (fors, fors) n. 1. The capacity to do work or cause physical
change; energy, strength, or active power: the force of an explosion. 2. a. Power made operative against resistance; exertion: use
force in driving a nail. b. The use of physical power or violence
to compel or restrain: a confession obtained by force. 3. a. Intellectual power or vigor, especially as conveyed in writing or
speech, b. Moral strength, c. A capacity for affecting the mind
•or behavior; efficacy: the force of logical argumentation, d. One
that possesses such capacity: the forces of evil. 4. a. A body of
persons or other resources organized or available for a certain
purpose: a large labor force, h. A person or group capable of
influential action: a retired senator who is still a force in national
politics. 5. a. Military strength, b. The entire military strength,
as of a nation, c. Units of a nation's military personnel, especially
those deployed into combat: Our forces have at last engaged the
enemy. 6. Law. Legal validity. 7. Physics. A vector quantity
that tends to produce an acceleration of a body in the direction of
its application, —force tr.v. forced, forcing, foroes. 1. To
compel through pressure or necessity: i" forced myself to practice
daily. He was forced to take a second job. 2. a. To gain by the use
of force or coercion: force a confession, b. To move or effect
against resistance or inertia: forced my foot into the shoe. c. To
inflict or impose relentlessly: He forced his ideas upon the group.
3. a. To put undue strain on: She forced her voice despite being
hoatse. b. To increase or accelerate (a pace, for example) to the

'lorce Vfo(a)rst rfd(3)rs, 'fdas, 'fd(3)s\ n -s often attrib [ME, :
fr. MF force, fr. (assumed) VL fortia% fr. L fortis strong -f -ia
•y — more at FORT] l a : strength or energy esp. of an exceptional degree : active power : VIGOR to : physical strength
or vigor of a living being {drained of all ~ by his mighty effort)
C : power to affect in physical relations or conditions <the ~
of the blow was somewhat spent when it reached him) <the
rising ~ of the wind) d : moral or mental strength esp. when
manifested as power of effective action (as in the overcoming
of deposition) (the ~ of his character had the impact of a
physical pressure) (a man of great ~ and determination)
e : power or capacity to sway, convince, or impose obligation
: VALIDITY, EFFECT (the ~ of his arguments) (who could resist

the ~ of such an appeal); often : legal efficacy : operative
effect (that law is still in ~ > (an agreement haying tne ~ of
law) 2 a : might or greatness esp. of a prince or state; often
: strength in or capacity for waging war (the ~ of this ford
was so great that no other would contest his right to rule)
to (1) 5 a group of individuals occupied with or ready for combat (the entire ~ of the fortress); usu 5 a body of troops, ships,
airplanes, or combinations thereof esp. when assigned to a
particular military purpose or necessity (took a small ^ of
infantrymen and searched the village) (the enemy assembled a
great ~ for the spring offensive) — see TASK FORCE (2) forces
pi : the whole military strength (as of a nation) : ARMED
FORCES C : a body of persons available for or serving a
particular end (a large available labor ~>; often : a more or
less organized group or staff having a common responsibility
or task (a conscientious police ~ > (the plantation ~ took a
half-holiday) 3 a : power, violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon or against a person or thing (conciliation
may succeed where.~ completely fails) (those who will not
respond to kindness must yield to ~ ) to : strength or power of
any degree that is exercised without justification or contrary
to law upon a person or thing C : violence or such threat or
display of physical aggression toward a person as reasonably
inspires fear of pain, bodily harm, or death 4 dial Eng : a
large part, quantity, or number 5 : an agency or influence (as
a push or pull) that if applied to a free body results chiefly in
an acceleration of the body and sometimes in elastic deformation and other effects (as from overcoming cohesion or adhesion
or sustaining weight) 6 X the quality of conveying impressions
intensely in writing or speech (as by vividness, cogency, or
passion) (a stimulating essay marked by ~ and cogency)
7 J an act (as of misdirection) or course (as of play) that
forces the response of another (as in a play in a game) into a
redetermined pattern (sometimes a ~ is useful for locating
onors in the opponents' hands) 8 a : the upper hollow embossing die t SCOUNTER 10b b : a specially formed bar or
plate attached to the underside of the slide of a punch press
chiefly for use in riveting and seaming 9 : a billiards stroke
made by striking a cue ball hard and just below the center so
that it rebounds or stops sharply or goes off at a desired angle
after striking the object ball

E

s y n VIOLENCE, COMPULSION, COERCION, DURESS, CONSTRAINT,

78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law.
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts
preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings,
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and
all discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is
by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the
jury, who are bound to accept it.

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.

77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.

77-7-7. Force in making arrest.
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed
of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used only as provided in Section
76-2-404.

76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or
placement in detoxification center.
(1) Aperson is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic
vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a
public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other
persons.

77-7-6. Manner of making arrest.
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of
his intention, cause, and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be
required when:
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety
of the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being
arrested to escape;
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of,
or an attempt to commit, an offense; or
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense or an escape.
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsection 78-24a-l(2), is
arrested for an alleged violation of a criminal law, including a local
ordinance, the arresting officer shall assess the communicative abilities of
the hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification, and any
further notifications of rights, warnings, interrogations, or taking of
statements, in a manner that accurately and effectively communicates
with the hearing-impaired person including qualified interpreters, lip
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with print-out capability,
and telecommunications devices for the deaf.
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be considered by any
court when evaluating whether statements of a hearing-impaired person
were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and
interferes with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful
order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-305, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 62, § 1; 1990, cb. 274, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1981, ch. 62, § 1 repealed former § 76-8-305,

as enacted by § 76-8-305, relating to interference with law enforcement official seeking to
detain interferor or another, and enacted
present § 76-8-305.

1

dispatch call that said there was a civil dispute and

2

disturbance, correct?

3

A

Yes,

4

Q

And in that call you were under the impression that

5
6

Maria Jacobs was throwing her neighbor's property, correct?
A

I wasn't under the impression, I was informed by

7

dispatch with the complainant on the line with dispatch

8

saying that she was throwing furniture.

9
10

Q

intoxicated, correct?

11

A

12

issue.

13

Q

14
15
16

And you were also told that she was extremely

I was told that there was a possible intoxication

Okay.

And then you arrived here and what is the

first thing that you notice?
A

The complainant standing at the doorway and some

furniture tumbled around the she was indicating to the car,

17 1 you need to stop her, she's drunk.
18

Q

So Maria was in the car at this time?

19

A

Yes, ma' am.

20

Q

Okay.

21

And you approached Ms. Jacobs and you

testified that you instructed her to exit the car, correct?

22

A

Yes, ma'am.

23

Q

You didn't tell her she was being arrested,

24
25 J

correct?
A

She wasn't being arrested at that time.

I was
12

1

investigating a disturbance.

2

Q

Okay, so you didn't tell her that?

3

A

No.

4

Q

And you didn't tell her why you wanted her to get

5
6
7
8
9

out of the car, did you?
A

I don't recall what the exact words I said at that

time.
Q

t

Okay.

There's nothing in the police report about

you mentioning why she had to get out of the car, correct?

10

A

I didn't specify that but...

11

Q

Okay.

12
13

And do you remember her saying at this time

that her dog was missing?
A

Like I said, I remember a tumult of statements

14

being issued from her you know, regarding no, I didn't do

15

anything wrong, I need to get my dog, I need to park my car,

16

this kind of - but it was very jumbled.

17
18
19

Q

You were aware that there was a concern she had

about her dog then?
A

I wasn't sure how it had anything to do with what

20

was going on.

21

further.

22

Q

23

this time?

24

A

25

Okay.

So that's why I wanted to question her

And do you remember a man approaching at

I don't recall anybody else.

I was pretty focused

on what was going on.
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1

Q

You don't remember if a car was in there also?

2

A

I don't remember.

3

Q

Now, you didn't take pictures of what you witnessed

4

on that car did you?

5

A

No ma'am.

6

Q

Okay.

7
8

Officer, you didn't see Maria Jacobs throw

any furniture on October 21 did you?
A

No, ma'am.

9

MS. WELCH:

I have no further questions.

10

THE COURT:

Redirect?

11
12

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FERBRACHE:

13

Q

14

right?

15

A

Yes, sir.

16

Q

At 1028 Riches Avenue?

17

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

18

Q

Salt Lake County?

19

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

20

Q

And it was dark outside?

21

A

Yes, it was 2:30 in the morning.

22

Q

2:30 in the morning.

23

You were in that area at around 2:30 a.m.; is that

And you were dispatched on a

civil dispute?

24

A

Yes, ma'am - yes, sir.

25

Q

That's fine.

When you're dispatched on a civil
19

1

dispute, is there at times criminal activity?

2

A

Is there, I'm sorry, what?

3

Q

Do you anticipate that there may be or may not be

4
5

criminal activity?
A

It was dispatched as an active civil dispute.

6

expected that there would be, you know, an ongoing active

7

problem at that point,

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Q

So I

And when you've been dispatched on domestic or

civil disputes, have you had to conduct arrests or engage in
detaining people for purpose of investigating the scene?
A

If I find it necessary for my safety or the safety

of the other people at the scene, yes.
Q

So when you approached, you really hadn't seen any

criminal conduct at that point; is that right?

15

A

No, sir.

16

Q

So your approaching and you observe somebody in a

17

vehicle; is that right?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

How often do you allow people to leave the scene of

20

an investigation?

21

A

Never.

22

Q

And so what would you do when somebody is

23
24
25

attempting to leave the scene of an investigation?
A

I would attempt to detain them so that I can

conduct my investigation.
20

Q

And is that what you did this evening?

A

Yes.

Q

And how did you do that?

A

I approached the vehicle and requested that she

exit the vehicle and speak to me.
Q

And what sort of tone or how did you conduct that?

A

You know, initially I'm sure I wouldn't have yelled

at her or been aggressive in that I really didn't know what
was happening yet.

I initially would approach the vehicle

and request in a civil tone that somebody cooperate with my
investigation.
Q

And at the point you opened the vehicle door, what

was the situation for you?
A
upset.

I could see that the person I was engaging was very
I could smell the alcohol.

I could see that she was

very tense, that she was angry.
Q

Was there an issue of safety?

A

At that point, yes there was.

I was concerned that

she would engage the vehicle and try to move the vehicle
because she kept screaming, M I need to get back to my parking
spot
Q

Was there an issue of criminal activity?

A

At that point I could see that there was a problem,

you know, because the furniture had been turned over and the
criminal activity at that point would have been being in or
21

1

about a vehicle with alcohol in your system.

2
3

Q

So what was the proper steps that you would take in

all situations?

4

A

In any situation where I need to question someone

5

whose being uncooperative,. I will put them in custody for my

6

safety and the safety of the person I'm questioning.

7 I

Q

And is this your training or is this your own

personal belief?
9 I
10
11

A

This is my training.

Q

And did you conduct that that evening, did you

follow through with your training?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And how did you do that?

14

A

I extricated Ms. Jacobs from the vehicle as she was

15

refusing to cooperate with my request to exit, the vehicle on

16

her own power.

17

placed her in custody.

So I extricated her from the vehicle and

18

Q

And you did that because?

19

A

Because I was fearful for her safety and my safety,

20

and the safety of all the other people on the scene.

2J- J
22

Q

Now there's a question as to the photographs and do

you carry a camera with you?

&$ | • •

A

No sir, I do not.

Q

Are you the person in charge of taking photographs?

A

No sir, I'm not.
22
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